In bankruptcy parlance, a “setoff” refers to the ability of a creditor and a debtor that owe each other money to apply their claims against one another, if called for under non-bankruptcy law.  As a prerequisite to exercising setoff rights, Section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) requires “mutuality” between debtor and creditor and debt and credit.  Mutuality exists when “the debts and credits are in the same right and are between the same parties, standing in the same capacity.”  In the absence of mutuality, a creditor’s refusal to pay amounts due to a bankrupt estate may violate various sections of the Code, including Section 362, the automatic stay, even if the estate also owes the creditor money.  Exceptions exist, however.  For instance, in 2005, Congress amended Section 560 and enacted Section 561 of the Code, to provide safe harbors for, inter alia, any pre-existing contractual right of a swap participant to offset or net termination values from the swap agreements in another participant’s bankruptcy.  On May 5, 2010, Judge James Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, presiding over the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) and its affiliates (collectively, Lehman), squarely addressed whether these Code amendments erased the requirement of “mutuality” for a party to a swap agreement to engage in a “setoff” under Section 553(a).  The Court held that “A contractual right to setoff under derivative contracts does not change well established law that conditions such a right on the existence of mutual obligations.”